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 Abstract 
On 13 July 2006, the European Court of First Instance (CFI) annulled the European 
Commission’s approval of the merger between the music units of Sony and Bertelsmann. In 
its Impala ruling, the CFI severely criticized the 2004 Commission decision because it found 
that the evidence relied upon by the Commission was not capable of substantiating its 
conclusion that the Sony BMG joint venture would not create or strengthen a collective 
dominant position. This judgment is highly significant for at least two reasons. First of all, it 
has potential implications for the future shape of the music industry, since the already 
completed concentration, which reduced the major players from five to four, is now being re-
examined by the Commission. Secondly, and more importantly, the CFI judgment raises 
fundamental questions about the standard of proof incumbent on the European Commission 
when dealing with merger cases. After the CFI’s annulment of three prohibition decisions in 
2002 (Airtours, Schneider Electric and Tetra Laval), the Sony BMG decision could in fact be 
seen as an attempt by the Commission to take into account the high burden of proof imposed 
on it by the Community Courts. The fact that this decision was annulled for not meeting the 
requisite legal standard for authorizing a merger, is therefore both ironic and challenging 
because it puts the Commission on a knife-edge. 
 
This paper will address this issue by assessing (1) to what extent the Impala judgment has 
actually raised the standard of proof incumbent on the Commission and, subsequently, (2) 
whether or not Impala - seen together with other recent jurisprudence concerning the required 
standard of proof in merger control - is imposing a too heavy burden on the Commission. Or, 
to put it more colloquially, this paper will seek to find out whether or not the CFI is imposing 
a too high standard of proof that the Commission, due to lack of the necessary resources, 
perhaps cannot meet. 
 
First, the concept of collective dominance will be explained and an overview will be given of 
the case law on the assessment of collective dominant positions in EC merger control. 
Second, the Commission’s 2004 clearance decision will be discussed. Where relevant, 
references will be made to previous merger cases in the music industry. Third, the Impala 
judgment will be summarized. Fourth, the judgment will be analyzed, and this in light of the 
recent jurisprudence of the Community Courts concerning the standard of proof incumbent on 
the Commission. On the basis of these findings, an answer to the two research questions will 
be formulated.  
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  1I.  Introduction
* 
 
On July 13, 2006, the European Court of First Instance (hereafter: CFI) annulled the 
European Commission (hereafter: Commission)’s decision authorizing the creation of Sony 
BMG, a joint venture incorporating the worldwide
1 recorded music businesses of Sony and 
Bertelsmann. In its 2004 clearance decision, the Commission had concluded that the merger 
would not create or strengthen a collective dominance position on the part of the majors 
(Universal, Sony BMG, Warner and EMI).
2 The CFI in Impala v Commission (hereafter: 
Impala), however, harshly criticized the decision because it found that the evidence relied 
upon by the Commission was not capable of substantiating this conclusion.
3  
 
The Impala judgment is highly significant for at least two reasons. First of all, it has potential 
implications for Sony and Bertelsmann as well as for the overall shape of the music industry, 
since the already completed concentration, which reduced the major players from five to four, 
is now being re-examined by the Commission.
4 If the Commission were to prohibit the 
merger, measures could be imposed on Sony and Bertelsmann to undo the transaction.   
Secondly, and more importantly, the CFI judgment raises fundamental questions about the 
standard of proof incumbent on the Commission when dealing with merger cases. The Sony 
BMG decision indeed should be seen in light of the CFI’s consecutive annulment of three 
prohibition decisions in 2002: Airtours v Commission (hereafter: Airtours)
5,  Schneider 
Electric v Commission (hereafter: Schneider)
6 and Tetra Laval v Commission (hereafter: 
Tetra Laval I)
7. The resoluteness by which the CFI criticized the Commission for its analysis 
of the evidence and questioned the rigor of its decisions in these judgments was 
unprecedented. First, in Airtours, the CFI found that the decision, “far from basing its 
prospective analysis on cogent evidence”, was vitiated by a series of errors of assessment. 
The Commission had concluded that the proposed merger would create a collective 
dominance position of three major tour operators on the UK market for short-haul package 
holidays. The CFI, however, bashed the Commission for reaching this conclusion “without 
having proved to the requisite legal standard” that effective competition on this market 
would be significantly impeded by the transaction.
8 Likewise, in Schneider Electric and Tetra 
Laval I, the CFI annulled the respective decisions because they had failed to provide 
                                                 
* The authors would like to thank Karen Donders for her valuable comments.  
1 Except for Japan. 
2 Sony/BMG (Case COMP/M. 3333) Commission Decision C(2004) 2815 [2005] OJ L62/30 
3 Case T-464/04 Independent Music Publishers and Labels Association v Commission (“Impala”) [2006] ECR II-2289 
4 On January 31, 2007 Sony and BMG re-notified the joint venture to the Commission (see [2007] OJ C29/12). Even though both 
parties brought an appeal against the Impala judgment before the ECJ, this proceeding has no suspensory effect (see [2006] OJ 
C326/25). 
5 CFI Case T-342/99 Airtours v Commission [2002] ECR II-2585 
6 CFI Case T-310/01 Schneider Electric v Commission [2002] ECR II-4071 
7 CFI Case T-5/02 Tetra Laval v Commission (“Tetra Laval I”) [2002] ECR II-4381 
8 Airtours v Commission, as note 5 above, at para 294 
  2“sufficiently convincing evidence” for the alleged effects of the merger.
9 The Court even 
considered the “errors, omissions and inconsistencies” it had found in the Commission’s 
analysis to be “of undoubted gravity”.
10 Consequently, the CFI concluded once more that the 
Commission had committed manifest errors of assessment by prohibiting the notified 
mergers. The three CFI judgments, which were delivered over a five-month period, gave rise 
to a flood of criticism of the Commission’s merger analysis and opened a debate about the 
economic soundness of its decisions.
11 Moreover, they acted a catalyst for a far-reaching 
reform of EC merger control, as former European Commissioner for competition Mario 
Monti acknowledged that the judgments exposed significant errors:   
 
“I believe that, in a certain time, with more hindsight, we will say that these 
judgments, no matter how painful, came at the right time. Indeed, there are no 
doubt lessons to be drawn from the judgments: in particular, it is clear that the CFI 
is now holding us to a very high standard of proof, and this has clear implications 
for the way in which we conduct our investigations and draft our decisions.”
12
 
In this regard, the detailed economic analysis that was undertaken by the Commission in the 
Sony BMG case should be seen as characteristic for the more central role that was given to 
economics thanks to the merger control reform.
13 The new EC Merger Regulation (hereafter: 
ECMR) clearly recognized the need for a sound economic framework
14, which resulted in e.g. 
the publication of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines
15 and the appointment of a Chief 
Economist and an accompanying team of economists to advance the use of economics in the 
Commission’s decision-making.
16 The Sony BMG decision could furthermore be seen as an 
attempt to comply with the strong felt standard of proof imposed on the Commission by the 
Community Courts. Indeed, while the Commission expressed concerns about the high degree 
of concentration in the music industry, it concluded that the evidence available was “not 
sufficiently strong” to prove collective dominance and thus approved the merger.
17 The fact 
that the decision was annulled for not meeting the requisite legal standard for authorizing a 
                                                 
9 Schneider Electric v Commission, as note 6 above, at para 394; Tetra Laval I, as note 7 above, at para 336 
10 Schneider Electric v Commission, as note 6 above, at para 404 
11 F.E.G. Diaz, “The Reform of European Merger Control: Quid Novi Sub Sole?” [2004] 27 World Competition 177-199  
12 M. MONTI, “Merger control in the European Union: a radical reform”, speech given at the European Commission/IBA 
Conference on EU Merger Control, Brussels, 7 November 2002. 
13 G. Aigner, O. Budzinski and A. Christiansen, "The Analysis of Coordinated Effects in EU Merger Control: Where Do We 
Stand after Sony/BMG and Impala?" (2006) 2 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=933548 accessed 8 May 2007>; S. Baxter and F. 
Dethmers, “Collective Dominance Under EC Merger Control – After Airtours and the Introduction of Unilateral Effects is There 
Still a Future for Collective Dominance?” [2006] 27 ECLR 151-152; N. Levy, “Mario Monti’s Legacy in EC Merger Control” 
[2005] 1 Competition Policy International 123-125 
14 Council Regulation (EC) 139/2003 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (“ECMR”) 
[2004] OJ L24/1, at recital 28 
15 Commission (EC) Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings [2004] OJ C31/3  
16 A. Christiansen, “The Reform of EU Merger Control – fundamental reversal or mere refinement?” (2006) 
<http://ssrn.com/author=369249 accessed 8 May 2007>; N. Levy, l.c., 123-125 
17 P. Eberl, “Following an in-depth investigation the Commission approved the creation of the Sony/BMG music recording joint 
venture on 19 July 2004” (2004) 3 Competition Policy Newsletter 10 
  3merger, is therefore both ironic and challenging because it puts the Commission on a knife-
edge. 
 
This paper will address this issue by assessing (1) to what extent the Impala judgment has 
actually raised the standard of proof incumbent on the Commission and, subsequently, (2) 
whether or not Impala - seen together with other recent jurisprudence concerning the required 
standard of proof in merger control - is imposing a too heavy burden on the Commission. Or, 
to put it more colloquially, this paper will seek to find out whether or not the CFI is asking a 
too high standard of proof that the Commission, due to lack of the necessary resources, 
perhaps cannot meet. 
 
In what follows, first of all, the concept of collective dominance will be explained and an 
overview will be given of the case law on the assessment of collective dominant positions in 
EC merger control. Second, the Commission’s 2004 clearance decision will be discussed. 
Where relevant, references will be made to previous merger cases in the music industry. 
Third, the Impala judgment will be summarized. Fourth, the judgment will be analyzed, and 
this in light of the recent jurisprudence of the Community Courts concerning the standard of 
proof incumbent on the Commission. On the basis of these findings, an answer to the two 
research questions will be formulated.   
 
 
II.  The assessment of collective dominance in EC merger control  
 
Both the concept of collective dominance as the Commission’s appraisal of a post-merger 
collective dominant position under the old Merger Regulation (Regulation 4068/89
18) as well 
as under the current ECMR has largely been developed by the jurisprudence of the 
Community Courts. In what follows, a brief overview will be given of this evolution, as this 
provides the needed framework against which the Commission’s analysis of the Sony BMG 
merger must be held. 
  
2.1 The concept of collective dominance  
 
The concept of collective (or oligopolistic) dominance can be defined in opposition to single-
firm dominance, which the ECJ described as:  
 
                                                 
18 Council Regulation (EEC) 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of concentrations between undertakings [1989] OJ 
L395/13 
  4“a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to 
prevent effective competition being maintained on the relevant market by giving it 
the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, 
customers and ultimately of its consumers”.
19  
 
The obvious difference is that, in the situation of a collective dominant position, the economic 
strength is collectively held by a small group of firms that have high market shares but are not 
individually dominant. A collective dominant position can be created or strengthened as a 
result of a horizontal merger in a concentrated market. This may lead to a significant 
impediment of competition if the structural changes caused by the merger increase the 
likelihood of parallel behavior between the remaining undertakings (e.g. on matters such as 
price, quality or production output).
20 Indeed, in a situation of collective dominance, the 
parties to the oligopoly may favor to coordinate their behavior - and thus to compete less 
vigorously - as this will enable them to enjoy higher prices and profits.
21 As such, the legal 
concept of collective dominance is closely related to the economic concept of collusion.
22 The 
competing undertakings can either explicitly or tacitly agree to adhere to a common policy, 
with the understanding that any deviation from this policy would trigger some retaliation. In 
the case of tacit collusion, this will not amount to an explicit agreement or concerted practice 
(within the meaning of Article 81 EC): the undertakings will rather act as if they were part of 
a cartel. 
 
2.2 Evolution of the legal test for the assessment of collective dominance/coordinated 
effects  
  
At the outset, it was unclear whether the old Merger Regulation (Regulation 4068/89) should 
apply to concentrations leading to the creation or strengthening of a collective dominance 
position. From a textual point of view this was disputable, as the notion of “collective 
dominance” was not mentioned in the Regulation. Furthermore, the substantive test in Article 
2(3) only referred to single-firm dominance.
23 However, this did not prevent the Commission 
                                                 
19 ECJ Case 27/76 United Brands Company v Commission [1978] ECR I-207, at para 65 
20 S. Bishop and M. Walker, The Economics of EC Competition Law: Concepts, Application and Measurement (Sweet & 
Maxwell, London, 1999) 149; I. Van Bael and J.-F. Bellis, Competition Law of the European Community (4
th edn Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague, 2005) 819 
21 A. Jones and B. Sufrin, EC Competition Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2001) 769; Europe 
Economics, “Study on Assessment Criteria for Distinguishing between Competitive and Dominant Oligopolies in Merger 
Control”, Final Report for European Commission DG Enterprise (2001) 2 
22 G. Aigner, O. Budzinski and A. Christiansen, l.c.; M. Ivaldo, B. Julien, P. Rey, P. Seabright and J. Tirole, “The Economics of 
Tacit Collusion”, Final Report for European Commission DG Competition (2003); F. Polverino, “Assessment of Coordinated 
Effects in Merger Control: between Presumption and Analysis”, SSRN working paper (2006) http://ssrn.com/abstract=901688 
accessed 8 May 2007> 
23 “A concentration which creates or strengthens a dominant position as a result of which effective competition would be 
significantly impeded in the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be declared incompatible with the common 
market”(emphasis added). 
  5from putting into practice its view that the Merger Regulation authorized it to act against 
collective dominance cases.  
 
The Commission examined oligopolistic markets under the Merger Regulation for the first 
time in 1992 when investigating a merger between Nestlé and Perrier
24, both active in the 
French market for bottled water. Two transactions were notified: the takeover of the French 
undertaking Source Perrier by the Swiss food giant Nestlé and the agreement between Nestlé 
and BSN (another major supplier on the French source water market) to sell one of the main 
sources of Perrier to BSN following the merger. The Commission believed that these 
transactions would alter the market structure in such a way that a duopolistic dominant 
position on the French bottled water market would be created. It referred in essence to the 
high market shares of Nestlé and BSN, to the lack of sufficient competitive counterweight 
and to the increased dependency of retailers and wholesalers on the range of brands of Nestlé 
and BSN.
25 Hence, the notified concentration was only deemed compatible with the common 
market after Nestlé offered substantial divestiture commitments. As anticipated above, the 
Commission’s Decision in Nestlé/Perrier triggered a debate about the question whether or not 
Article 2(3) of the Merger Regulation is applicable to cases of collective dominance. On the 
one hand, there were the proponents of a literal interpretation of this provision. On the other 
hand, there were those who followed the Commission’s argumentation by stressing that the 
purpose of the Merger Regulation would be seriously undermined if collective dominance 
positions were excluded from its scope
26.  
 
The ECJ, in France v Commission (hereafter: Sali & Kalz)
27, clearly favored the 
Commission’s approach, stressing that Article 2 of the Merger Regulation needs to be 
interpreted by reference to its purpose and general structure.
28 Referring to the preambles of 
the Regulation, the ECJ consequently held that the purpose of this Regulation would be 
partially frustrated if it were accepted that only concentrations creating or strengthening a 
dominant position on the part of the parties to the concentration were covered by it.
29 As a 
result, it was firmly established that the Merger Regulation equally applies to collective 
dominant positions. The approach to collective dominance since then has evolved 
considerably.  
 
                                                 
24 Nestlé/Perrier (Case IV/M.190) Commission decision of 22 July 1992 [1992] OJ L56/1; M. Clough, “Collective Dominance – 
The Contribution of The Community Courts” in M. Hoskins and W. Robinson (eds.) A True European: Essays for Judge David 
Edward (Hart Publishing, Portland, 2003) 175-177 
25 Nestlé/Perrier, as note 24 above, at para 108  
26 E. Navarro, A. Font, J. Folguera and J. Briones, Merger Control in the European Union: Law, Economics and Practice (2
nd 
edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005), 209-210 
27 ECJ Case 30-95 France and others v Commission (“Kali & Salz”) [1998] ECR I-1375 
28 Ibid., at para 168 
29 Ibid., at para 171 
  6In Gencor/Lonrho
30, the CFI made clear that, in order to substantiate a finding of collective 
dominance, the Commission is not required to demonstrate the existence of structural links 
between the undertakings concerned. According to the Court, the existing relationship could 
simply be one of economic interdependence.
31 The Commission’s prohibition decision, 
appealed by Gencor on this particular ground, was therefore upheld. With this ruling, the CFI 
not only elucidated its past rulings on the matter
32, it moreover brought the concept of 
collective dominance in alignment with economic thinking about tacit collusion.
33  
 
The next, and undoubtedly the most important milestone in the development of the concept of 
collective dominance was the CFI judgment in Airtours.
34 Airtours, a UK based tour operator 
and supplier of package holidays, sought to acquire full control over First Choice, one of its 
competitors. The Commission prohibited the proposed merger because it would create a 
collective dominant position in the UK market for short-haul foreign package holidays that 
would significantly distort competition.
35 To substantiate its finding of collective dominance, 
the Commission primarily referred to the assertions that the merger would lead to a higher 
degree of market concentration
36, that it would increase the degree of transparency and 
interdependence
37 and that it would further marginalize the smaller operators or new 
entrants
38. It is striking, however, that the Commission’s assessment appeared to be strongly 
based on the rational incentives that existed for the oligopoly members to behave in an anti-
competitive way.
39 In this regard, the Commission clearly stated that: “it is not a necessary 
condition of collective dominance for the oligopolists always to behave as if there were one 
or more explicit agreements (…) between them. It is sufficient that the merger makes it 
rational for the oligopolists, in adapting themselves to market conditions, to act - individually 
- in ways which will substantially reduce competition between them”.
40 The Commission 
even went as far as to argue that, because it found that there were strong incentives to collude, 
the existence of a strict punishment mechanism was not a necessary condition for a finding of 
                                                 
30 CFI Case T-102/96 Gencor v Commission [1999] ECR II-753 
31 Ibid., at para 276. 
32 The applicant had argued, on the contrary, that the existence of structural links was an essential requirement for findings of 
collective dominance, hereby referring to the CFI judgment in the Flat Glass case (Joined Cases T-68/89, T-77/89 and T-78/89 
SIV and Others v Commission [1992] ECR II-1403). The Court stressed, however, that it had only mentioned links of a 
structural nature in this former judgment by way of example. It thus did not laid down that such links must exist in order for a 
finding of collective dominance to be made. Ibid., at para 273   
33 J. Cook and C. Kerse, EC Merger Control (4
th edition, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2005) 219; Europe Economics, l.c., 3-4 
34 CFI Case T-342/99 Airtours v Commission  [2002] ECR II-2585; S. Baxter and F. Dethmer, l.c.; M. Clough, o.c.,180-185 
35 Airtours/First Choice (Case IV/M.1524) Commission decision of 22 September 1999 [2000] OJ L93/1  
36 Ibid., at para 169 
37 Ibid., at para 190 
38 Ibid., at para 171 
39 E. Navarro, A. Font, J. Folguera and J. Briones, o.c., 200-201 
40 Airtours/First Choice, as note 35 above, at para 54. In Tetra Laval II, the ECJ elaborated on this issue by stressing that the 
Commission, when considering the likelihood of the adoption of certain future conduct, is not only required to take into account 
the incentives to adopt such conduct but also the factors “liable to reduce, or even eliminate, those incentives”. ECJ Case C-
12/03 P Commission v Tetra Laval (“Tetra Laval II”) [2005] ECR I-978, at para 74 
  7collective dominance in this case
41. It hereby referred to the fact that, in its Gencor judgment, 
the CFI remained silent as regards the relevance of a retaliation mechanism.
42 The CFI took a 
different stance, however, stressing that any assessment of an alleged collective dominant 
position must not only view that position statically, but must also consider whether this 
collusion is sustainable over time.
43 In that context, the Court clarified that the Commission is 
not obliged to prove that there is a specific retaliation mechanism, but that it must nonetheless 
establish that deterrent factors exist.
44   
 
Further elaborating on the substantive test to be used by the Commission, the CFI put forward 
three conditions that are essential for a finding of collective dominance. First, there must be 
sufficient market transparency so that each member of the dominant oligopoly has the ability 
to know the other members’ market conduct. This is a requisite for being capable of 
monitoring whether or not the other members are adopting the common policy. Second, there 
must be adequate deterrents to ensure that there is an incentive not to depart from the 
common policy. As already mentioned, this condition furthermore requires that the deterrents 
are capable of making coordination sustainable over time. Third, the benefits of coordination 
must not be jeopardized by the action of current and future competitors or consumers.
45 By 
spelling out these three criteria, the CFI thus gave explicit guidance on the elements the 
Commission needs to establish before it can reach the conclusion that a merger would result 
in the creation of a collective dominant position. In the past, the Commission applied a non-
binding list of factors as indicators of collective dominance, which made it difficult to predict 
the outcome of its analysis. Without precluding the Commission from taking into account a 
wide range of factors, the Airtours judgment thus made clear which conditions should attract 
prominent consideration.
46 That being said, the three conditions still leave ample room for 
interpretation, as will be demonstrated by the analysis of the Impala judgment below.   
 
Two more recent evolutions also need to be highlighted. As explained above, the trilogy of 
judicial defeats in 2002 acted as a catalyst for a series of reforms that culminated most 
prominently in the adoption of a revised ECMR in 2004. The Commission’s defeat in 
Airtours in particular added fuel to the debate about the articulation and the scope of the 
dominance test of the old Merger Regulation (cf. supra).
47 With a view to ensure legal 
                                                 
41 Airtours/First Choice, as note 35 above, at para 55; F. Polverino, l.c., 22 
42 Airtours/First Choice, as note 35 above, at para 150. Indeed, in Gencor, the Court only mentioned that in a situation of 
collective dominance, each member is aware that highly competitive action on its part “would provoke identical action by the 
others, so that it would derive no benefit from its initiative” (Gencor v Commission, as note 30 above, at para 276). As Polverine 
argues, this appears only a weak reference to a punishment mechanism (F. Polverino, l.c., 22).  
43 Airtours v Commission, as note 5 above, at para 192 
44 Ibid., at para 195 
45 Ibid., at para 62 
46 N. Levy, l.c., 121 
47 See e.g. F.E.G. Diaz, l.c.  
  8certainty, the Commission therefore proposed to modify the substantive test for the 
compatibility assessment of a concentration. From May 1, 2004 on the test has been whether 
or not a notified concentration would “significantly impede effective competition in the 
common market or in a substantial part of it, in particular as a result of the creation or 
strengthening of a dominant position” (Article 2(2) and (3) ECMR), which is a notable 
departure from the strong emphasis the old Merger Regulation put on dominance.
48 Of further 
relevance are the 2004 Horizontal Merger Guidelines
49, which were also part of the EC 
merger control reform package. Interestingly, these guidelines replaced the formerly used 
concepts of collective and single-firm dominance by making a differentiation between, 
respectively, “coordinated effects” and “non-coordinated effects” instead.
50 Furthermore, it 
should be noted that the Commission, in the section on coordinated effects, adopted the three-
prong Airtours test and codified other principles that were set out in the abovementioned 
jurisprudence. In addition, the guidelines have provided for a more systematic approach by 
listing relevant factors that the Commission will consider in its assessment (e.g. product 
homogeneity, customer characteristics and stability of the demand and supply conditions).
51 
Even though the Commission has been careful not to establish a rigid set of criteria, more 
recent decisions have clearly demonstrated the importance it attributes to most, if not all, of 
the market characteristics mentioned in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines.
52
 
 
III. The Sony BMG Commission Decision 
 
In January 2004, Sony and Bertelsmann notified their plans to merge their recorded music 
businesses worldwide (except for Japan) to the Commission. The proposed concentration was 
still assessed under the old merger regulation, Regulation 4064/89.
53 Because the 
Commission found that the transaction raised serious collective dominance concerns, it 
decided to initiate an in-depth investigation.
54 This hardly came as a surprise: the 
Commission had already entertained similar concerns in the context of the 1998 merger 
between Seagram and Polygram, that reduced the number of majors from six to five, and in 
the context of the withdrawn EMI/Time Warner merger (cf. supra). In the Seagram/Polygram 
case, however, the Commission considered that the concentration would not affect the 
                                                 
48 See note 23 
49 Commission (EC) Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings [2004] OJ C31/3 
50 Ibid., at para 22. The terms “coordinated” and “non-coordinated” effects were first elucidated in the US Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines. 
51 Ibid., at paras 39-57. These assessment factors are broadly in line with economic literature on tacit collusion. G. Aigner, O. 
Budzinski and A. Christiansen, l.c., 8  
52 J. Cook and C. Kerse, o.c., 222 
53 Hence, the re-notified Sony BMG merger is again being assessed under the old Merger Regulation (Regulation 4064/89).   
54 Commission press release IP/04/200 of 12 December 2004 “Commission opens in-depth investigation into Sony/Bertelsmann 
recorded music venture” 
  9European market because of Polygram’s limited market presence outside the United States.
55 
In Sony BMG, on the contrary, the Commission issued a Statement of Objections that 
confirmed its initial concerns. Yet, in light of the parties’ response to the objections the 
Commission remarkably changed its position and eventually cleared the merger by a decision 
of July 19, 2004.
56 After the approval of the merger by competition authorities around the 
world (e.g. the United States, Australia, Canada, Switzerland, Poland and South Africa)
57, the 
Commission thus too gave green light for the creation of Sony BMG, a full function (50-50) 
joint venture incorporating the parties’ activities in the discovery and development of artists 
(A&R)
58 and in the marketing and sale of sound recordings. 
 
The Commission’s assessment focused on the question whether the notified concentration 
would significantly impede competition as a result of the creation or strengthening of a 
(collective) dominant position in the markets for physical recorded music (including A&R, 
promotion, sales and marketing), for licenses for online music and for online music 
distribution. In addition, the Commission analyzed whether the Sony BMG joint venture 
would have spillover effects in the music publishing markets.
59
 
As regards the possible strengthening of an existing collective dominant position in the 
recorded music market, the Commission assessed whether coordinated price policy of the 
majors could be identified. For this purpose, price developments over the last three to four 
years were considered. The Commission particularly focused on the five largest EU Member 
States, namely the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy and Spain.
60 Firstly, the 
Commission examined the development of the average wholesale net prices for the top 100 
single albums of each major. Even though it believed that these average prices give a 
representative picture of the major’s pricing behavior
61, the Commission in addition analyzed, 
secondly, whether any parallelism could have been reached on the basis of list prices, the so-
called Published Prices to Dealers (hereafter: PPDs). Thirdly, it considered whether the 
different major’s discounts were aligned and sufficiently transparent to allow efficient 
monitoring of any coordinated price policy.
62  
 
                                                 
55 Seagram/Polygram (Case IV/M.1219) Commission Decision [1998] OJ C309/8, at paras 26, 29 
56 Sony/BMG, as note 2 above 
57 Also the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and Mexico. Impala, as note 3 above, at para 229 
58 These are the so-called Artist & Repertoire (A&R) activities, in essence the music’s industry’s research and development. 
59 Music publishing consists mainly of the acquisition by publishers of music rights and their subsequent exploitation. Ibid., at 
para 40. 
60 The Commission also briefly analyzed the smaller markets in the Netherlands, Sweden, Ireland, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, Norway, Portugal and Greece. It concluded the market structure in these markets to be comparable to the bigger 
countries. Consequently, it found that the main conclusions of the assessment of the five largest markets were also valid for the 
smaller countries. Ibid., at paras 148-153.  
61 Ibid., at para 70. 
62 Two main types of discounts were identified: invoice discounts (file and campaign discounts on the invoice level) and 
retrospective discounts (discounts on a volume level).  
  10The Commission’s economic analysis of price developments in the five main European 
markets revealed certain indications of coordinated behavior. On the basis of the average net 
prices, the Commission found some parallelism and a relatively similar price development of 
the majors in all these Member States.
63 Furthermore, the Commission concluded that PPDs 
are transparent enough to enable monitoring of other majors’ list pricing. The parties had 
argued to the contrary that they use more than 50 PPDs in the investigated markets (with the 
exception of Spain).
64 The Commission, however, stressed that the top 5 PPDs of both parties 
account for the greater part of their total sales. Given the fact that the PPDs are available in 
the majors’ catalogues, it consequently found that they could have been used to align the list 
prices of the best selling albums.
65 Nevertheless, the Commission repeatedly emphasized that 
these observations were as such not convincing enough to constitute sufficient evidence of 
coordinated pricing behavior in the past. In addition, it countered its conclusions on the 
average net prices and PPDs with the finding that Sony and BMG’s discounts were not 
sufficiently aligned. Even though both undertakings have a system of weekly sale reports, the 
Commission could not establish that these reports ensured a sufficient degree of transparency 
of competitors’ campaign discounts.
66  
 
As the assessment of the majors’ price development did not yield persuasive evidence of 
existing collective dominance, the Commission further analyzed whether features facilitating 
collective dominance characterize the markets for recorded music. Three elements were 
considered: product homogeneity, market transparency and past retaliatory action. As regards 
product homogeneity, the market investigation revealed that the way in which albums are 
priced and marketed on the wholesale level appear to be quite standardized. The Commission 
believed, however, that the heterogeneity of the content makes tacit collusion difficult since it 
would require monitoring on the level of individual albums.
67 As regards market 
transparency, the Commission referred to the publication of weekly hit charts and Sony and 
BMG’s weekly sale reports (which include information on competitors) as devices in the 
market that might facilitate the monitoring of an agreement. Nevertheless, it concluded that 
there was not sufficient evidence that the majors had overcome certain deficits as regards the 
transparency of discounts. In particular, the Commission stressed once more that in relation to 
campaign discounts, monitoring on album level would be needed.
68 As regards retaliation, the 
Commission identified two measures that could represent possibilities for retaliation against 
any “cheating” major: (1) a return to competitive behavior or (2) the exclusion of the deviator 
                                                 
63 Ibid., at paras 74-75, 80-81, 88-89, 95-96, 102-103 
64 In the case of Spain, the parties submitted that the amount of PPDs they use is in the range between 20 and 50 (the exact 
number is not disclosed in the published decision for reasons of confidentiality). Ibid., at para 104 
65 Ibid., at paras 76, 83, 90, 97, 104 
66 Ibid., at para 80, 87, 94, 101, 108 
67 Ibid., at para 110 
68 Ibid., at paras 111-113 
  11from compilation joint ventures (e.g. the refusal to license tracks for the deviator’s 
compilation albums). The Commission found no evidence, however, that such means have 
been used or threatened in the past.
69 In light of all these considerations, the Commission 
concluded that – notwithstanding the finding that the recorded music markets display certain 
features that indicate a conduciveness to collective dominance – there was “not sufficient 
evidence to establish that the proposed concentration would lead to a strengthening of an 
existing collective dominant position”.
70  
 
The same conclusion was drawn with regard to the possible creation of collective dominance 
in the market for recorded music. The Commission acknowledged that in some oligopolistic 
markets a reduction of the players might lead to the creation of a collective dominant position. 
It stressed, however, that the features of the market remain decisive when making this 
assessment. Given the fact that no real evidence was found that the reduction of major 
recording companies from five to four would significantly facilitate transparency and 
retaliation, the Commission accordingly concluded that the concentration was not likely to 
create a dominant position - notwithstanding the existence of factors conducive to collusion.
71 
Interestingly, the Commission had reached the opposite conclusion in the context of its 
examination of the merger between EMI and Time Warner in 2000. After opening an in-depth 
investigation
72, the Commission preliminary found that this merger would lead to the creation 
of a collective dominant position in the recorded music market, as the reduction of majors 
would make an already “very transparent” market even more predictable.
73 A final decision, 
however, was never taken: the parties withdrew their notification at the end of the second 
phase investigation.
74 Notwithstanding the fact that precedents do not bind the Commission 
and that the industry conditions were different four years ago, this inconsistency is certainly 
remarkable.  
 
In the remaining part of its decision, the Commission briefly addressed additional competition 
concerns that were raised by third parties. Firstly, it considered whether the concentration 
would lead to a single dominant position in some national markets (Germany, Netherlands, 
Belgium, Luxembourg and France) due to the joint venture’s vertical relationship to the 
media interests of Bertelsmann. The Commission found, however, that Sony BMG would not 
                                                 
69 Ibid., at paras 114-118 
70 Ibid., at para 154 
71 Ibid., at para 157 
72 Commission press release IP/00/617 of 14 June 2000, “Commission opens full investigation into Time Warner/EMI merger” 
73 V. Rabassa, “The Commission’s review of the media merger wave” (2001) 1 Competition Policy Newsletter 49; Impala, as 
note 3 above, at para 331 
74 The fact that EMI and Time Warner gave up the merger was not only due to the Commission’s alarming preliminary 
conclusions, but should also be seen as a concession to enable Time Warner and AOL to merge. H. Ranaivoson, “Cultural 
Diversity and Competition Policy in the Recording Industry”, paper presented at the Fourth International Conference on Cultural 
Policy Research, 12-16 July 2006, 8     
  12reach the threshold of single dominance, in particular because Universal is an equally strong 
competitor in these markets.
75 With regard to the online music markets, the Commission, 
secondly, concluded that there was not sufficient evidence of an existing collective dominant 
position in the markets for licenses of online music. Moreover, it found it unlikely that such a 
position would be created since prices are currently in flux as a result of the developing state 
of the market.
76 It will be interesting to see how the Commission will address this issue in its 
new Sony BMG decision, since it already indicated that it would take into account the 
growing sales of online music since 2004.
77 Thirdly, the Commission dismissed the claim that 
Sony, as a result of the concentration, would obtain a single dominance position on the 
national markets for the distribution of online music. It mainly argued that the Sony Connect 
music downloading service currently does not have a share of the market – it was only 
launched in three EU Member States in July 2004 – whereas other players (e.g. Apple’s 
iTunes) already gained a certain position.
78 Finally, the Commission assessed the risk that the 
notified transaction would have as its effect the coordination of the activities of Sony’s and 
Bertelsmann’s music publishing activities, which were excluded from the scope of the joint 
venture. It found that, since collecting societies mainly carry out the administration of the 
publishing rights, there was little room for Sony and Bertelsmann to coordinate. 
Consequently, the Commission also refuted the concern of possible spillover effects.
79
 
 
IV.  The CFI Impala judgment 
 
The Commission’s clearance decision was appealed to the CFI by the Independent Music 
Publishers and Labels Association (Impala), an international trade association representing 
over 2500 independent record companies and music publishers. The CFI entirely focused on 
the first two pleas that were put forward by Impala, namely the claim that the Commission 
made a manifest error of assessment and an error of law by finding that (1) the Sony BMG 
merger would not strengthen an existing collective dominant position in the market for 
recorded music and (2) the merger would not create such a position.
80 Both claims were 
examined in light of the Commission’s findings relating to market transparency and the use of 
retaliation, as the CFI observed that these were the essential grounds for the Decision.
81 What 
is more, these two elements constitute the most prominent criteria of the Airtours test. In its 
                                                 
75 Ibid., at paras 163-164 
76 Ibid., at paras 168-170 
77 Commission press release IP/04/200 of 12 December 2004 “Commission opens in-depth investigation into Sony/Bertelsmann 
recorded music venture” 
78 Sony/BMG, as note 2 above, at paras 173-175 
79 Ibid., at paras 179,182 
80 Ibid., at para 31 
81 Ibid., at paras 275-277 
  13judgment, delivered in July 2006, the CFI found both grounds of annulment to be well 
founded on the basis of the following considerations. 
  
a)  The strengthening of a pre-existing collective dominant position 
 
As regards the first plea, the Court first and foremost concluded that the assertion that the 
markets for recorded music are not sufficiently transparent to permit a collective dominant 
position “is not supported by a statement of reasons of the requisite legal standard and is 
vitiated by a manifest error of assessment”.
82 The Court not only criticized the Decision for 
its overall lack of evidence, but also held that the available evidence, as mentioned in the 
Decision, is not capable of supporting the conclusions that are drawn from them.  
 
Firstly, the CFI preliminary remarked that the section of the Decision dealing with the 
examination of transparency is surprisingly succinct, as it only contains three recitals.
83 
Secondly, on a more substantial level, the Court emphasized that the Commission principally 
mentioned factors that “far from demonstrating the opacity of the market, show, on the 
contrary, that the market was transparent”.
84 The Court even went as far as to argue that the 
Commission had underestimated the importance of these factors. In particular, it emphasized 
that the observed sources of price transparency (e.g. the public nature of PPDs and the limited 
number of reference prices) are capable of giving rise to a high level of transparency.
85 The 
Court furthermore dismissed the finding that list prices of albums are rather aligned as a 
“prudent conclusion to say the least” since “the alignment was in fact very marked”.
86 
Thirdly, and subsequently, the CFI heavily criticized the Commission for countering these 
sources of transparency with the “rather limited and unsubstantiated” assertion that 
campaign discounts could reduce transparency and make tacit collusion more difficult.
87 As 
discussed above, the Commission argued that there was no collective dominant position 
owing to the deficits found in actual transparency. The only element of opacity mentioned in 
the Decision, however, is the assertion that campaign discounts are less transparent so that 
price coordination would require further monitoring on the level of individual albums (cf. 
supra). The Court invalidated this reasoning in a forceful manner: 
 
“Clearly, such vague assertions, which fail to provide the slightest detail of, in 
particular, the nature of campaign discounts, the circumstances in which such 
discounts might be applied, their degree of opacity, their size or their impact on 
                                                 
82 Ibid., at para 475 
83 Ibid., at para 289 
84 Ibid., at para 290 
85 Ibid., at para 347  
86 Ibid., at para 299 
87 Ibid., at para 294 
  14price transparency, cannot support to the requisite legal standard the finding that 
the market is not sufficiently transparent to allow a collective dominant position”
88
 
“(T)he few assertions relating to campaign discounts (…), in so far as they are 
imprecise, unsupported, and indeed contradicted by other observations in the 
Decision, cannot demonstrate the opacity of the market or even of campaign 
discounts.”
89  
 
Consequently, the CFI maintained that the evidence put forward in the decision could not 
support the conclusions which the Commission drew from them. It stressed in particular that 
the findings concerning the degree of opacity and the relevance of campaign discounts are 
vitiated by a manifest error of assessment. As regards the opacity of campaign discounts, the 
Court pointed out that the retailer’s responses to the Commission’s market investigation 
indicate a higher degree of transparency than that referred to in the Decision.
90 Furthermore, 
it rejected the Commission’s assumption that the criteria according to which campaign 
discounts are generally granted are so numerous that they render their application opaque. 
While admitting that the combinations of the criteria increase the hypothetical situations, the 
Court emphasized that the Commission had failed to demonstrate that the exercise would be 
excessively difficult for a market professional.
91 As regards the relevance of campaign 
discounts, the CFI was just as unequivocal in criticizing the Decision. The Court rebuked the 
Commission for not investigating whether campaign discounts represent a sufficiently 
significant element of the price of the albums to be capable of eliminating the necessary 
market transparency.
 92  
 
After a thorough review of the findings relating to market transparency, the CFI briefly 
examined the Commission’s assessments concerning retaliation. These assessments constitute 
the second essential ground on which the Commission concluded that there was no collective 
dominant position. The CFI observed, however, that the Commission was not in a position to 
indicate the slightest step it had undertaken to substantiate the assertion that no retaliation 
measures have been used or threatened in the past. Moreover, the Court pointed out that the 
Commission had not identified any case of a breach of the common pricing policy.
93 Hence, 
the CFI concluded that the analysis in the Decision relating to retaliation is, like the one 
                                                 
88 Ibid., at para 289 
89 Ibid., at para 320 
90 Ibid., at para 375 According to the Court, the retailer’s responses, far from being expressly negative, clearly reveal quite strong 
transparency in both PPDs and discounts. (385) 
91 Ibid., at para 429 
92 The CFI firmly stated that the Commission “ought at least to have explained in the Decision how, in spite of their minimum 
real effect on prices and the presence of the numerous factors of transparency identified in the Decision, the campaign discounts 
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  15relating to market transparency, vitiated by an error of law and a manifest error of 
assessment.
94  
 
b)  The creation of a collective dominant position 
 
As regards the second plea, the CFI equally found that the Commission’s fact-finding and 
analysis were not capable of supporting its conclusions. The Court stressed that the question 
whether the Sony BMG merger would create a collective dominant position in the recorded 
music market raised serious problems, requiring a thorough examination. According to the 
Court, such an examination was not carried out: the Decision at the most provides 
observations that are “superficial, indeed purely formal”.
95 The CFI, for instance, criticized 
the Commission for not investigating if the merger would enhance market transparency so to 
permit coordinated behavior.
96 This shortcoming is even more striking in light of the 
Commission’s observations about the EMI/Time Warner merger (cf. supra). Concerning the 
issue of retaliation, the CFI moreover found that the Commission had misinterpreted the 
condition set out in Airtours. In its Decision, the Commission simply referred to the 
examination it carried out in respect of the existence of a collective dominant position (cf. 
supra). The Court found this reasoning to be erroneous, as the condition is perfectly capable 
of being satisfied without there having been any retaliatory measures in the past.
97 Since this 
sheds new light on the evidentiary burden required to satisfy the Airtours test, this point will 
be discussed in more detail in the following section.  
 
In light of all the foregoing considerations, the CFI concluded that inadequate reasoning and a 
manifest error of assessment vitiated the Decision. Consequently, it found that the Decision 
had to be declared void.
98  
 
 
V.  The standard of proof incumbent on the Commission in EC merger control 
  
The Impala judgment raises several fundamental questions concerning the standard of proof 
in EC merger control that go beyond the facts of the Sony BMG case. These issues therefore 
deserve closer attention. In what follows, it will be assessed whether or not Impala has 
actually increased the standard of proof incumbent on the Commission, be it directly (as some 
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  16have argued
99) or indirectly (by imposing additional requirements to the merger review 
process).  
 
At the outset, it is important to distinguish the standard of proof from the, albeit closely 
related, concept of the burden of proof. Whereas the former refers to the type, amount and 
probative value of the evidence that is needed to establish something, the latter refers to “the 
act of presenting the evidence” that is needed to satisfy that standard of proof”.
100 In the 
context of EC merger control, the burden of proof is ultimately on the Commission to 
establish whether or not a notified merger is compatible with the common market. However, 
the notifying parties bear an initial evidentiary burden, as they are required to submit a 
substantial amount of information at the moment of notification.
101
   
5.1  The standard of proof in EC merger control: general observations 
 
Even though probability is a matter of judgment and can be applied to varying degrees, the 
law has sought to define the degree of probability for different types of proceedings. In this 
regard, a distinction can be made between at least two standards of proof: a “beyond 
reasonable doubt” standard and a “balance of probabilities” standard.
102 The fist standard is 
the highest and most burdensome standard of proof, typically used in criminal cases. Since it 
requires compelling evidence to proof that something is certain beyond a reasonable doubt, it 
is acknowledged that this would not be the most appropriate standard for merger control.
103 
The issue in merger cases is whether a merger is likely to have an effect on the relevant 
market, which requires a prospective analysis and thus inevitably involves a certain amount of 
judgment.
104 On the basis of the expressions used in the jurisprudence, it indeed appears that 
the Community Courts rather have the “balance of probabilities” standard in mind in the field 
of merger control.
105 This more forgiving standard, commonly used in civil cases, has often 
been expressed as whether it is more likely than not that something has happened or will 
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  17happen.
106 Given the flexibility that is inherent to the “balance of probabilities” standard, 
however, this still raises the question as to what the actual degree of likelihood is that the 
Commission’s fact-finding and analysis in merger cases must meet.  
 
Neither the ECRM nor the EC Treaty make any reference to the standard of proof incumbent 
on the Commission in merger control, so it is necessary to look at the case law of the 
Community Courts for guidance. At the outset, it must be noted though that a definite and 
precise standard of proof has yet to be articulated.
107 Indeed, the Courts usually refer to the 
“requisite legal standard” without explaining how high that standard is.
108 Furthermore, it has 
been argued that, even though the use of the term “requisite legal standard” has remained 
consistent over the years, the application of this standard seems to tell a different story.
109 In 
this section, it will be assessed whether this is true, in particular for Impala. In this regard, it 
is important to keep in mind that the debate about the standard of proof in EC merger control 
is not new: the issue first and most prominently came to the fore in the context of the 
Commission’s appeal against the CFI Tetra Laval I judgment. This was the only ruling of the 
2002 trilogy (Airtours, Schneider and Tetra Laval I) that was appealed by the Commission, 
despite the fact that the CFI annulled the respective prohibition decision in light of a 
practically similar standard of proof and with the same intensity of judicial review. The 
Commission believed that this ruling in particular raised several problems of legal 
principle.
110 Inter alia, it contended that the CFI had made an error in law as to (1) the 
standard of proof that it is required to satisfy and (2) the scope of the CFI’s power of judicial 
review.
111 Hence, the ECJ ruling on the appeal is a landmark decision providing explicit 
guidance on these fundamental issues. Before assessing the implications of Impala for the 
required standard of proof in merger cases, it is therefore indispensable first to discuss the 
ECJ judgment on this appeal (Tetra Laval II) and its wider relevance in light of previous case 
law. 
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  185.2  Tetra Laval II and the standard of proof 
 
On February 15, 2005 the ECJ delivered its long awaited Tetra Laval II judgment, its second 
ever ruling in the field of merger control.
112 The ECJ upheld the CFI Tetra Laval I ruling, 
which had annulled the Commission prohibition decision.
113 In the context of its plea relating 
to the standard of proof, the Commission essentially claimed that the CFI, by requiring it to 
constitute “convincing evidence”
114 that a proposed merger “in all likelihood”
115 will give 
rise to significant anti-competitive effects, imposed a disproportionate standard of proof for 
merger prohibition decisions that is “impossible to meet in practice”.
116 It took the view that 
this test differed substantially, both in degree and in nature, from the requirement to produce 
‘cogent and consistent’ evidence, as established by the ECJ in Kali & Salz.
117 According to 
the Commission, the standard of ‘convincing evidence’ was clearly higher, because it 
eliminated the possibility that another body would be able to reach a different conclusion.
118 
Tetra Laval on the other hand, contented that this ground of appeal was nothing more than a 
“semantic discussion of the terms used” that had little to do with the substantive examination 
carried out by the CFI.
119
 
In Tetra Laval II, the ECJ discarded the Commission’s arguments by stating that the CFI, in 
its call for a precise examination supported by ‘convincing evidence’:  
 
“by no means added a condition relating to the requisite standard of proof but 
merely drew attention to the essential function of evidence, which is to establish 
convincingly the merits of a decision on a merger”
120
 
Even though it can be argued that a debate about different standards of proof is never purely 
semantic
121, the ECJ thus showed that in substance Tetra Laval was right.
122 The use of the 
term ‘convincing’ on itself can therefore not be seen as a real departure from previous case 
law. Not in the least because the CFI, in Tetra Laval I as well as in Airtours, appeared to use 
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  19the terms ‘cogent’ and ‘convincing’ evidence as synonyms.
123 However, it is useful to take a 
closer look at the ECJ’s teachings on the standard of proof to see whether they perhaps reveal 
that the standard has been raised after the Tetra Laval judgments, either intentional or not.  
 
As regards factual matters, the ECJ clarified that the evidence relied upon  needs to be 
“factually accurate, reliable and consistent”, should contain “all the information which must 
be taken into account in order to assess a complex situation” and must be “capable  of 
substantiating the conclusions drawn from it.”
124 Moreover, it stated that the Community 
Courts must verify whether the Commission has closely examined all the relevant 
circumstances.
125 As regards the prospective analysis, the ECJ acknowledged that merger 
control requires a difficult assessment of the way in which a proposed concentration might 
alter the factors determining the level of competition on a given market. Since this entails a 
prediction of events, and not an examination of current or past events (as is the case for 
antitrust investigations), this analysis needs “to be carried out with great care”.
126 
Furthermore, it makes it necessary “to envisage various chains of cause and effect with a 
view to ascertaining which of them are the most likely”.
127 This is an explicit reference to the 
earlier mentioned “balance of probabilities” standard. It can be noted that the CFI required the 
Commission to establish the alleged anticompetitive effects “in all likelihood” whereas the 
ECJ only speaks of the need to ascertain the most likely developments.
128 However, arguing 
that the ECJ intended to mitigate the CFI’s more stringent formulation of the test appears to 
be ambiguous since the EC highest court obviously did not dispute the test put forward by the 
CFI.
129 Turning to the specific situation of conglomerate mergers, the ECJ further recognized 
that the chains of cause and effect following such a merger are particularly dimly discernible 
and difficult to establish.
130 In light of these uncertainties, the ECJ stressed that the quality of 
the evidence produced by the Commission is even more important, since that evidence must 
support its conclusion that, if a prohibition decision were not adopted, the economic 
development envisaged by it would be plausible.
131  
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  20The way in which the ECJ addressed the issue of the standard of proof in Tetra Laval II leads 
to at least two important observations. First, the fact that the Court was more definite about 
the evidentiary obligation in the case of conglomerate mergers appears to confirm that the 
standard of proof may vary according to the type of merger. Unfortunately, the ECJ did not 
spell out whether, and if so, which other types of mergers would require particularly sound 
evidence to support the conclusion that the two conditions of Article 2(3) ECMR have been 
met. Since it only drew attention to the difficulties inherent in proving a leveraging theory, it 
could be argued that the Court only found a higher standard indispensable for conglomerate 
(or, arguably, collective dominance
132) mergers. However, this does not imply that the 
clarifications made by the ECJ are solely relevant for these types of concentrations. On the 
contrary, it is clear from the wording of the judgment that the Court first set out principles 
applicable to merger control in general before considering the specific case of conglomerate 
mergers.
133 The way in which the ECJ elucidated the required standard of proof, as discussed 
above, is therefore insightful for all merger cases. Second, it must be observed that the 
clarifications given by the CFI and the ECJ are not capable of substantiating the view that the 
Community Courts significantly raised the standard of proof. Indeed, both Tetra Laval 
judgments essentially recapitulate the principle that, were the Commission finds that a 
concentration would lead to a situation in which effective competition in the common market 
is significantly impeded, it is incumbent upon it to provide cogent, consistent evidence 
thereof. This is the standard that was set out by the ECJ in Sali & Kalz – a standard that was, 
although considered to be high, instantly recognized by the Commission in Price 
Waterhouse/Coopers & Lybrand.
134 Unlike the remarkable intensity with which the CFI 
scrutinized the Commission’s substantive assessments
135, there thus not appears to be 
anything new about the manner in which the Community Courts - in Tetra Laval - specified 
the quality of the evidence the Commission is required to produce. The CFI, reiterated by the 
ECJ, simply re-emphasized the need for the Commission to base its findings on solid 
evidence. Or, as the CFI phrased it recently, it is not enough for the Commission to put 
forward a series of logical but hypothetical developments (which it fears would have harmful 
effects for competition): 
 
“Rather, the onus is on it to carry out a specific analysis of the likely evolution of 
each market on which it seeks to show that a dominant position would be created or 
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  21strengthened as a result of the merger and to produce convincing evidence to bear 
out that conclusion.”
136
 
Consequently, the authors conclude that the much discussed semantic difference between the 
expressions ‘cogent and consistent’ and ‘convincing’ evidence is not reflecting any 
significant departure from the approach put forward in previous judgments. Nevertheless, the 
ECJ’s final word on the Tetra Laval case remains relevant because of the way in which it 
clarified certain issues related to the standard of proof. Hence, Impala needs to be assessed in 
light of this jurisprudence. It is important to note, however, that the ECJ – unlike the 
Advocate General (hereafter: A.G.) - refrained from addressing one important matter, namely 
the Commission’s argument that the evidentiary obligation required by the CFI effectively 
created a presumption in favor of the legality of (conglomerate) mergers.
137 In Tetra Laval I it 
was indeed stated that a concentration must be authorized if both conditions laid down in 
Article 2(3) ECMR are not fulfilled.
138 The Impala judgment, in which the CFI annulled not a 
prohibition but a clearance decision for not meeting the required standard of proof, 
interestingly challenges this presumption and consequently brings the discussion about the 
standard of proof required by the Community Courts back to the fore. 
 
5.3  Impala and the standard of proof: a departure from the past? 
  
As already indicated, Impala addresses several significant issues related to the standard of 
proof that are of wider relevance for merger control. For this reason, the judgment will have 
(and already has) important consequences for the Commission’s future handling of 
complicated merger cases. In what follows, these consequences will be identified and 
evaluated. First and foremost, it will be observed that Impala imposes a symmetrical standard 
of proof on the Commission for clearance and prohibition decisions. Second, the relevance of 
Impala  for the future implementation of the Airtours test will be discussed. Third, the 
implications of Impala for the Commission’s investigation process will be examined.  
 
5.3.1  Symmetrical application of the standard of proof 
 
What the Impala judgment first of all (and perhaps most importantly) demonstrates, is that the 
standard of proof the CFI requires the Commission to satisfy equally applies to prohibition 
and clearance decisions. This is of great importance for future merger control analysis, as it 
makes clear that the Commission will always have to make a strong case one way or the 
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  22other. Contrary to some commentators
139, the authors believe that this is a logical and positive 
development in the case law. 
 
The discussion about the desirability of a symmetrical standard of proof is underpinned by a 
broader yet closely related issue, namely the question whether there exists (or should exist) a 
bias against or in favor of the legality of mergers. In Tetra Laval II, the Commission 
submitted that this was not the case, as the compatibility assessments of mergers should be 
guided by a principle of neutrality. It mainly relied upon the symmetrical nature of the legal 
requirements laid down by Article 2(2) and (3) ECMR: if a concentration would (or would 
not) lead to the creation or strengthening of a dominant position as a result of which effective 
competition is significantly impeded, the Commission is to prohibit (or, respectively, 
authorize) the concentration.
140 As indicated above, the ECJ unfortunately did not dwell upon 
this issue in Tetra Laval II. A.G. Tizzano did, however, and strongly opposed the 
Commission’s reasoning. Whereas it would be incorrect to take the A.G.’s opinion as a 
persuasive authority, it is certainly worth considering the two main arguments he put 
forward.
141 To support his view that the symmetry of the conditions provided for in Article 
2(2) and (3) ECMR cannot be absolute, A.G. Tizzano firstly referred to Article 10(6) ECMR. 
This article stipulates that where the Commission has not taken a decision within the time 
limits set, the notified merger “shall be deemed to have been declared compatible with the 
common market”. According to A.G. Tizanno, this clearly demonstrates that, in the case of 
uncertainty, the Community legislature preferred to run the risk of authorizing a transaction 
that is incompatible with the common market.
142 Secondly, he argued that a bias towards 
authorization is justified because the Commission and the national competition authorities 
still have the opportunity to intervene ex post on the basis of the EC antitrust rules.
143  
 
Contrary to A.G. Tizanno’s view, the authors contend not only that there is no clear legal 
basis to assume prima facie that a merger is lawful, but moreover that such a presumption 
would go against the underlying rationale of EC merger control. Indeed, the assertion that the 
ECMR carries an in-built presumption in favor or against mergers is flawed. To start with, 
there exists no directly applicable prohibition for mergers: unlike cartels (Article 81 EC) or 
state aid (Article 87 EC), mergers are thus not, as a rule, considered to be incompatible with 
the common market. Moreover, it must be stressed that, even though the Commission must 
satisfy both conditions of Article 2(3) ECMR before it can prohibit a merger, the same must 
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  23be true of the two conditions of Article 2(2) for clearing a merger.
144 The symmetrical 
structure of Articles 2(2) and (3) ECMR - and the same can be said for Articles 8(1) and (2) 
ECMR - therefore logically implies that the evidentiary obligation should be equal. In 
General Electric, the CFI expressly confirmed this by stating – admittedly, somewhat in 
contrast with its contention in Tetra Laval I – that the Commission must not find in favor of a 
concentration in case of doubt, but rather must always make an actual decision one way or 
another.
145 This may in turn be understood as reflecting a legislative policy not to weight the 
scales in favor of the interests of either the merging parties or the consumers.
146 Finally, it 
must be stressed that A.G. Tizzano’s reliance on the text of Article 10(6) ECMR is not 
convincing. It is certainly true that a merger will be deemed to have been declared compatible 
if the Commission fails to take a decision within the prescribed deadlines. However, this will 
only result in an implied decision that still can be appealed.
147 Moreover, it would be wrong 
to overestimate the importance of Article 10(6) ECMR, as this is mainly an in-built protection 
for the parties against a Commission’s failure to act in time.  
 
In any case, it must be observed that the CFI, in Impala, refrained from taking a clear stance 
in the debate on the alleged presumption in favor of the legality of mergers. It did, however, 
rightly pointed out that the Commission must conduct its investigation in a robust and 
unbiased way.
 148 Furthermore, Impala does make clear – or at least strongly implies - that the 
standard of proof should be equal for clearance and prohibition decisions. As some authors 
have argued, this may pose problems for the Commission when it is confronted with 
ambiguous evidence.
149 A.G. Tizzano spoke in this regard about “grey area” cases where it is 
difficult to foresee the effects of a notified transaction and, consequently, where it is difficult 
to arrive at a clear distinct conviction that the merger would or would not lead to the creation 
or strengthening of a collective dominant position.
150 While it is certainly true that such cases 
strongly increase the Commission’s burden of proof – and indeed make it difficult to meet the 
required legal standard – it would be wrong, however, to derive from this that the 
Commission should by default opt for a clearance decision in the case of doubt. Indeed, an 
unequal standard of proof in favor of clearance may in practice lead to the undue 
authorization of anti-competitive mergers. This was precisely the fear that was raised in the 
aftermath of the 2002 Airtours/Schneider/Tetra Laval I judgments. It can even be considered 
that it was in light of this jurisprudence that the Commission – aware of the high standard of 
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  24proof and the intensity of judicial review - concluded that the evidence was “not sufficiently 
strong” to underpin a prohibition decision in the Sony BMG case.
151 The authors therefore 
welcome the symmetrical standard of proof, as this will prevent the Commission from opting 
for a clearance decision to be on the safe side. Consequently, Impala rightly confirms that 
notified transactions must be assessed from a position of neutrality and that the Commission 
must always take a fully reasoned decision based on sound evidence - a standard that the 
Sony BMG decision clearly did not meet (cf. supra). Nevertheless, it is undeniable that the 
ambitious symmetrical standard of proof will pose challenges for the Commission in cases of 
persistent doubt – and some would identify the Sony BMG case as an example of this - where 
it is difficult to make a strong case either way. Indeed, the Commission cannot take a “grey 
area” decision. Once the decision to clear or prohibit the merger is taken, the Commission 
will draft it accordingly in the most convincing way.
152 It has been suggested that the 
Commission could simply opt for a system of “running out of the clock”, where it would 
refrain from adopting clearance decisions altogether and rely on Art 10(6) ECMR instead.
153 
However, it is doubtful that the Commission will be willing to respond to Impala in such a 
radical way. 
 
5.3.2  The Airtours test for the establishment of coordinated effects revisited  
 
The Impala judgment is furthermore insightful for the standard of proof that the Commission 
must satisfy in the specific case of an alleged collective dominant position. Indeed, in Impala 
the CFI remarkably departed from the original Airtours test. Quite in contrast to the claim that 
the ruling explicitly raised the standard of proof, the CFI in fact lowered the evidentiary 
obligation for the finding of an existing collective dominance position. This illustrates that the 
three Airtours conditions are not clear-cut yet. Unfortunately, the same can be said about the 
CFI’s teachings on this test in Impala.  
 
Firstly, the CFI observed that the existing case law on collective dominance was developed in 
the specific context of the assessment of the possible creation of a collective dominant 
position. It stressed that in this case the Commission is required to carry out a “delicate 
prognosis” as regards the likely development of the market.
154 The appraisal of an existing 
collective dominant position is different, the Court argued, because here the Commission has 
the clear advantage that it can base its decision on “a series of elements of established facts, 
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  25past or present”.
155 While this appears to be self-evident, it should be noted that the CFI used 
the distinction to suggest that the Airtours conditions could be more easily fulfilled in the case 
of a preexisting collective dominant position. Most remarkably, the CFI stated that: 
 
“although the three conditions (…) are indeed also necessary, they may, however, 
in the appropriate circumstances, be established indirectly on the basis of what may 
be a very mixed series of indicia and items of evidence relating to the signs, 
manifestations and phenomena inherent in the presence of a collective dominant 
position”
156
 
“Thus, in particular, close alignment of prices over a long period, especially if they 
are above a competitive level, together with other factors typical of collective 
dominant position, might, in the absence of an alternative reasonable explanation, 
suffice to demonstrate the existence of a collective dominant position, even where 
there is no firm direct evidence of strong market transparency, as such 
transparency may be presumed in such cases”
157
  
This deviation from the original Airtours test seems to indicate that the CFI wanted to lower 
the evidentiary threshold for a finding of a collective dominant position. This can be seen as 
an explicit recognition of the difficulties the Commission may encounter when investigation 
complex “grey area” collective dominance cases. The CFI even suggested that in the case of 
the Sony BMG merger, the alignment of prices over the last six years – together with other 
factors and in the absence of an alternative explanation – might indicate that this alignment is 
not the result of the normal play of effective competition and thus might suffice to 
demonstrate the existence of coordinated price behavior.
158 According to some commentators, 
this provides a bright spot for future intervention on the basis of coordinated effects.
159 It is 
doubtful, however, that the Commission will actually explore this variation of the Airtours 
test in the context of the reexamination of the merger. Not only because the CFI clearly 
indicated that its statements were part of an obiter dictum, but even more so because the test 
is far from clear-cut (e.g. the undefined “indicia and items of evidence” or the vague 
formulation of “appropriate circumstances”). Consequently, the Commission would take a 
considerable risk when it would choose to establish the Airtours conditions indirectly.  
 
Secondly, and more specifically, the CFI indicated that the requirements for the fulfillment of 
the second Airtours  condition (the existence of effective deterrent mechanisms) could be 
different in the context of an assessment of past coordination. The Court did acknowledge 
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  26that the mere existence of retaliatory measures is in principle sufficient (cf. supra).
160 It thus 
disagreed with the Commission, who took the view that it was necessary to prove that such 
measures have actually been used in the past. What is more, the CFI considered that the 
Commission has to satisfy two cumulative elements before it can establish the absence of past 
retaliatory action: first, there must be proof of deviation from the common policy and second, 
the Commission must be able to demonstrate the absence of retaliatory measures.
161 By doing 
so, the CFI put forward two additional criteria that essentially elevate the evidentiary burden 
for the finding that the retaliation condition is not fulfilled. Again, the distinction between the 
analysis of the post-merger creation and the appraisal of the existence of a collective 
dominant position, made the CFI apparently feel confident enough to depart from the 
previous case law. In light of the Sony BMG merger this can be seen as a second 
straightforward concession to the Commission to make it easier to satisfy the Airtours 
conditions for a finding of collective dominance.  
 
5.3.3  Implications of Impala for the Commission’s investigation 
 
In light of the foregoing, it cannot be argued that Impala has significantly raised the standard 
of proof. While the CFI did make clear that the standard it requires the Commission to satisfy 
is symmetrical, it has been argued that this is both a logical and welcome clarification. 
Moreover, the CFI in fact lowered the evidentiary threshold for the finding of an existing 
collective dominance, arguably in recognition of the criticism that the test was too 
demanding. Nevertheless, two elements of the judgment do affect the evidentiary burden 
incumbent on the Commission in a less favorable way: first, the CFI’s criticisms as regards 
the Commission’s reliance on the parties’ data and second, the importance the CFI ascribed to 
the Statement of Objections (hereafter: SO). 
 
The way in which the CFI reproached the Commission for basing its findings relating to 
campaign discounts solely on data relating to - and prepared by - the notifying parties, is a 
first notable aspect of the Impala judgment. As discussed above, the CFI concluded that none 
of the information available could confirm that campaign discounts rendered the market for 
recorded music opaque, contrary to what the Commission had contended in its Decision. 
However, the Court not only criticized the Commission’s findings but also overtly questioned 
the objectivity of the data it had relied upon. The Court stressed in this regard that the 
assessments inferred from the variations in campaign discounts were only supported by data 
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  27provided by (the economic advisers of) Sony and BMG.
162 While the CFI acknowledged that 
the Commission could not ascertain in the slightest detail the reliability of all the information 
submitted to it, it nevertheless stated that the Commission “cannot go so far as to delegate, 
without supervision, responsibility for conducting certain parts of the investigation to the 
parties to the concentration”.
163  
 
There are already signs that the Commission is adapting its approach in light of these 
criticisms. Indeed, recent cases (including the re-examination of the Sony BMG merger) 
demonstrate that the Commission’s requests for information are becoming more lengthy and 
demanding.
164 The downside of the CFI’s insistence on obtaining data from third parties, 
however, is that it adds an additional burden to an already time-constrained and complex 
merger review process. Moreover, the obtainment of such data is far from self-evident, as 
experience shows that third parties are generally reluctant to provide complete and reliable 
data on a timely basis, especially in the context of coordinated effects concerns. This is of 
course partly due to the fact that the relevant data often is commercially sensitive. The 
Commission indeed cannot issue a prohibition decision based on data that is not made 
accessible to the notifying parties without violating their right to reply.
165  
 
The second problematical aspect of Impala, namely the importance that was given to the SO, 
is even more significant because of the potentially far-reaching procedural (and even 
substantial) implications it has for the Commission’s future handling of merger cases. The SO 
is a normal procedural act in a second phase merger procedure that enables the parties to 
exercise their rights of defense. Article 18(1) ECMR stipulates that undertakings concerned 
have the right, at every stage of the procedure, to make their views on the Commission’s 
objections against the concentration.
166 For that reason, the Commission is required to address 
these objections in writing to the notifying parties.
167 This is done by the issuance of a SO, 
which sets forth the Commission’s preliminary findings both on the facts and on their legal 
and economic significance.
168 This is of great importance, as the Commission can only base 
its decision on objections on which the parties have been able to submit their observations.
169 
There is no formal deadline as regards when the Commission must send the notifying parties 
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  28the SO. Usually it will not be finalized until between six and eight weeks after receipt of the 
decision initiating the Phase II investigation. There is a recent tendency to issue the SO at the 
later end of this period – if not beyond.
170 In the SO, the Commission shall set a time limit 
within which the parties and other involved parties must supply its response in writing 
(normally two weeks).
171 The written procedure can also be supplemented by formal oral 
hearings before the Hearing Officer, as requested by the parties in the Sony BMG case.
172
 
In its Impala judgment, the CFI acknowledged that the SO is a preparatory document 
containing assessments that are purely provisional. It highlighted, accordingly, that the 
Commission is not obliged to explain in its final decision any change in its position by 
comparison with that set out in the SO.
173 This is in line with the case law. In Aalberg 
Portland v Commission, for instance, the ECJ unequivocally stated that the Commission may, 
and even must, abandon objections that have been shown to be unfounded by the parties.
174 
However, a careful reading of the Impala judgment makes clear that the CFI attributed a far 
more important role to the SO, despite all the lip service it paid to the jurisprudence on this 
matter.
175  
 
Contrary to its final decision, the Commission had argued in its SO that the notified Sony 
BMG merger was incompatible with the common market. As explained above, it 
provisionally concluded that the merger would strengthen a collective dominance position 
(both in the recorded music market and the wholesale market for online music licenses) and 
would coordinate the parties’ behavior in a way incompatible with Article 81 EC.
176 The CFI 
not only found this “fundamental U-turn in the Commission’s position” surprising, but also 
harshly criticized the Commission for not being capable of demonstrating how the previous 
findings were incorrect. In this regard, the CFI stressed that:  
 
“unless the entire investigative administrative procedure is to be deprived from the 
slightest value, the Commission must be able to explain, not in the decision, 
admittedly, but at least in the context of the proceedings before the Court, its 
reasons for considering its provisional findings were incorrect”.
177   
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  29The CFI thus took the position that, while the Commission is entitled to modify provisional 
assessments made in the SO, the findings made in the Decision must be compatible with the 
findings of fact made in the SO, in so far as it is not established that these findings were 
incorrect.
178 It moreover stressed that the investigation into the competition problems 
essentially takes place before the SO, so that the Commission’s objections can only be refuted 
by  “particularly reliable, objective, relevant and cogent” evidence.
179 Consequently, the 
identified discrepancies between several findings made in the SO and the conclusions drawn 
from them in the Decision, were deemed to be highly problematic by the Court. The CFI even 
accused the Commission for having suppressed relevant elements “on the sole ground that 
they might not be consistent with its new assessment”.
180 Not in the least because the 
Commission only changed its initial position - that was based on an investigation lasting five 
months - in the wake of the arguments put forward by the parties at the hearing, without 
conducting any new market investigations to (in)validate them.
181  
 
The extent to which the CFI used the SO as a benchmark for its review of the Decision is 
unseen and has important consequences beyond the facts of this case. While the authors agree 
that the Commission must be capable of explaining the reasons for a fundamental change in 
its position - the Sony BMG decision is indeed highly problematical in this regard - they also 
believe that the importance the CFI attributed to the SO in Impala has swung the pendulum 
too far. The CFI’s approach actually implies that it is not so much the applicant that has to 
demonstrate a manifest error in the Decision, but it is rather the Commission that has to prove 
before the Court that its preliminary findings were incorrect.
182 This has set a legal precedent 
that will make the Commission far more hesitant to reconsider its findings after the issuance 
of a SO. Given the numerous examples where the Commission had to abandon its initial 
objections because they were shown to be erroneous, such a dynamic is certainly 
deplorable.
183 In fact, it would undermine the existing system of internal checks and balances 
by making the administrative procedure practically irreversible once the Commission starts 
drafting its SO.
184 These internal checks and balances not only include due process rights 
(e.g. the right to respond in writing and orally), but also the process of inter-service 
consultation between the Competition Directorate General and other Commission services 
(e.g. the Legal Service and other Directorate Generals) as well as the consultative function of 
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  30the Advisory Committee on concentrations.
185 Furthermore, it would seriously jeopardize the 
parties’ rights of defense, since the parties are only capable of responding properly to the 
Commission’s objections after they have been made clear to them.  
 
The options for the Commission to anticipate these difficulties when it again would find it 
necessary to fundamentally depart from the objections set out in a SO, appear to be twofold.   
On the one hand, the Commission could foresee more time after issuing the SO so 
that it can investigate the soundness of the parties’ observations. This strategy was actually 
followed in Ineos/BP Dormagen, arguably as a direct response to the Impala judgment.
186 
After examining the parties’ response to the SO, the Commission made use of its 
investigative powers under Article 11 ECMR to request information from competitors in 
order to assess the validity of the evidence that was submitted. In light of this new evidence, 
the Commission ultimately decided to clear the proposed merger.
187 This approach has its 
limits tough: because of the mandatory time restrictions governing the adoption of decisions, 
there is very little room for conducting fresh investigations.
188  
On the other hand, the Commission may choose to simply avoid the formal SO stage. 
Especially in adversarial “grey area” cases, the Commission could decide to test its main 
arguments with the parties early on in the process instead. There are indications that the 
Commission is exploring this scenario as well.
189 However, the obvious drawback of this 
approach is that it seriously impedes third parties access to the SO and further undercuts the 
internal checks and balances system.
190
So whatever path the Commission will prefer to follow - until the ECJ has delivered its 
judgment on Impala and perhaps beyond - it remains to be seen whether this will prove to be 
a positive procedural change.   
 
 
VI.  Conclusions 
 
After the annulment of three prohibition decisions in 2002 (Airtours, Schneider and Tetra 
Laval I), the Impala judgment was widely perceived as another crushing defeat for the 
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189 For reasons of confidentiality, specific examples of cases are omitted from ithis paper.   
190 S.B. Völcker and C. O’Daly, l.c., 594 
  31Commission. Moreover, it reignited the debate on the question whether the Community 
Courts are imposing a too high standard of proof, not in the least because the Commission’s 
Sony BMG decision was representative for the recent economic sophistication of EC merger 
control and for the Commission’s more cautious approach towards prohibition, two direct 
consequences of the 2002 CFI rulings. The analysis of Impala points out, however, that the 
judgment is in fact a far less bitter pill for the Commission than some observers have argued. 
Indeed, the analysis first of all did not confirm the assertion that Impala has significantly 
raised the standard of proof. On the contrary, the CFI in fact substantially lowered the 
evidentiary threshold for establishing an existing collective dominant position (even though 
its statements on the Airtours test are far from unambiguous). This can be seen as a 
recognition of the fact that the conditions for the finding of collective dominance might be too 
difficult to meet in practice, especially in complicated “gray area” cases. The fear that this in 
turn would lead to the undue clearance of anti-competitive mergers, is precisely the reason 
why the authors welcome Impala for clarifying that the standard of proof is equal for 
clearance and prohibition decisions. If anything, the Sony BMG decision demonstrates the 
drawbacks of an asymmetrical standard of proof: far from arguing why the merger would not 
lead to the creation or strengthening of a collective dominant position, the Commission 
mainly indicated why the evidence was “ not sufficient” to underpin a prohibition decision. 
Impala therefore rightly confirms that the Commission cannot opt for a clearance decision to 
be on the safe side but rather must always take a fully reasoned decision based on sound 
evidence – a standard the Sony BMG decision clearly did not satisfy. Hopefully, this will also 
re-establish the legal certainty that a clearance decision will be permanent, as the notifying 
parties have little control over ensuring that the Commission’s analysis can withstand judicial 
scrutiny.  
 
The implications of Impala are not without problems, however. The extent to which the CFI 
used the SO as a benchmark for its review of the decision is particularly troublesome, as this 
will make the Commission far more hesitant to reconsider its findings after the issuance of the 
SO. While the CFI correctly criticized the Commission for not being capable of explaining 
the fundamental change in its position vis-à-vis the Sony BMG merger, such a dynamic is 
deplorable. In fact, it seriously undermines the purpose of the SO and, consequently, 
jeopardizes the parties’ right to defense, as they are only capable of properly responding to 
the Commission’s objections after they have been made clear to them. It will therefore be 
interesting to see how the ECJ will address this issue in its judgment on Sony’s and 
Bertelsmann’s appeal against Impala. A further problematic aspect of Impala is the CFI’s 
insistence on obtaining data from third parties. Indeed, the Commission’s more lengthy and 
demanding information requests in the aftermath of Impala already illustrate the additional 
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process. 
 
Knitting together the threads, it becomes clear that Impala will have (and already has) far-
reaching practical consequences for the Commission’s handling of difficult merger cases. 
While the authors welcome the symmetrical standard of proof and strongly disagree with the 
claim that Impala has significantly raised the standard of proof – the CFI in fact lowered this 
standard for the finding of collective dominance – they a the same time fear that Impala 
further complicates an already time-constrained and complex administrative procedure. The 
Commission will therefore have to find ways to improve the quality of its decision-making in 
light of the issues raised in Impala, at least until the ECJ has delivered its judgment and 
perhaps beyond. When asked in a 2002 interview whether the Commission has the necessary 
resources to meet the Community Court’s standards, the president of the CFI responded that it 
did not, but that this could not refrain the Court from striking down flawed decisions.
191 
Much has changed in the last five year, however, so hopefully the Commission will be able to 
enhance the efficiency of EC merger control without a radical reform of the current 
procedures. In such a scenario, Impala may in a certain time be remembered not as a setback 
but rather as the necessary stimulus for change.  
                                                 
191 AJB, “Preuve solide: the cfi raises the bar” (December 2002) In Competition http://www.linklaters.com/in_competition/2 
00212.htm>; J. Quatremer, “Un contrôle des fusions plus intense”, Libération (7 November 2002) http://www.liberation.fr/ 
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